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INTRODUCTION
The Massacre at No Gun Ri is another dark story of war, it
occurred fifty years ago during the Korean War. The world has
witnessed a great number of unbelievable atrocities; this incident
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might seem to be just one of many. Killings and massacres are
still being committed throughout the world. However, realizing
that more than one hundred innocent civilians, including
women and children, were intentionally killed by U.S. soldiers,
we cannot turn our eyes away from this tragedy.
The United States joined the Korean War in support of
South Korea's fight against Communist North Korea. They were
supposed to fight against the North Korean People's Army but
ended up committing an unacceptable war crime against an
allied country's civilians. According to reports and evidence, this
appears to be the second biggest war crime case in the history of
the U.S. Army. The most notorious U.S. war crime case hap-
pened in 1968, known as the Massacre at My Lai, Vietnam.'
War is defined as a legal condition in which two or more
groups carry on a conflict by armed force.2 "In the past 5,000
years, approximately 14,000 wars have been fought, resulting in
five billion deaths."3 During World War I, ten million human
beings were killed. World War II cost forty million lives, with
many more deaths resulting from disease and epidemics.4 Sev-
enty-three armed conflicts took place between 1945 and 1969,
with the estimated proportion of civilian to combatant deaths ten
to one in a conventional war and one hundred to one in a
nuclear war.5 In the Korean War, fought from June 25, 1950 to
July 27, 1953, about 37,000 U.S. soldiers were killed. An ironic
aspect of war is that the primary victims are civilians rather than
the soldiers; more than 3 million Koreans died while millions
more became refugees, homeless and distraught. About 37,000
United States soldiers were killed in the war. Mass destruction,
pain and suffering are the fate of the innocent people in war.
What is a "War Crime?" War crimes are the violations of the
laws or customs of war. 6 In other words, a war crime is conduct
that violates international laws governing war. War, however,
consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in
time of peace-killing, wounding, destroying, or carrying off
1. Cf JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN et al., THE My LAI MASSACRE AND rrs COVER-UP:
BEYOND THE REACH OF LAw 1-15 (1976).
2. Helen Fein, Discriminating Genocide From War Crimes: Vietnam and
Afghanistan Reexamined, 22 DENVERJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y (1993) (quoting QUINCY
WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 8 (1942)).
3. Audrey I. Benison, War Crimes: A Human Rights Approach to a Humanita-
rian Law Problem at the International Criminal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 141,174 (1999).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 175.
6. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 5
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316, reprinted in 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 374 1 118 (1950) [hereinafter Report of the LL.C.].
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other peoples' property. Such conduct is not regarded as crimi-
nal if it takes place during the course of war. However, the "right
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited."7 Even when at war, the law of war must be abided;
this is called jus in bello.
The current rules on armed conflict have their roots in the
practice of belligerents in the Middle Ages. Hugo Grotius, the
"Father of International Law," "was the first to enunciate the doc-
trine that the 'justness' of the cause for which belligerents
resorted to war did not negate the belligerents' duty to observe
the rules of warfare."' Currently, many treaties and agreements,
such as the Hague Conventions,9 the Geneva Conventions,1" and
Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions" consti-
tute positive international humanitarian law. In addition, cus-
tomary international law plays a significant role when the
codified laws of war are not suited to govern particular cases.
The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunals supplies the classic
definition of three major crimes under the international law:
7. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, with annex of regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 22, 36 Stat. 2277, 2301, T.S.
No. 539, at 647 [hereinafter Hague Convention (TV)].
8. EDwARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLIcr: PER-
SONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 9 (1992).
9. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, with annex of regulations, Sept. 4, 1900, 1 Bevans 247, T.S. No. 403
[hereinafter Hague Convention (II)]; Hague Convention (IV), supra note 7.
10. Gevena Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field, Geneva, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906, 1 Bevans 516 (no longer in force); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 2 Bevans 965; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter
Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention].
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, If (1977),
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, II (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977)
[hereinafter Protocol II].
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(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, ini-
tiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public
or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during
the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
12
The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court cate-
gorizes international crimes in a slightly different way: (a) the
crime of genocide, (b) crimes against humanity, (c) war crimes,
and (d) the crime of aggression. 3 The Rome Statute states that
"Crimes against humanity [are crimes] committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian pop-
ulation, with knowledge of the attack."14 On the other hand,
"War crimes [are] grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949," or "other serious violations of the laws and cus-
toms applicable in international armed conflict, within the estab-
lished framework of international law."1 5 The Rome Statute,
Article 8 (2) (b), specifies the acts of war crimes:
12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1998, art. 6 in
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 11
(1947). It also states that leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices par-
ticipating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by
any persons in execution of such plan. Id.
13. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
art. 5(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, (1998).
14. Id. at art. 7(1).
15. Id. at art. 8(2).
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(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian popu-
lation as such or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities; ...
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated ....
The main difference between war crimes and crimes against
humanity lies in their relationship to war. Crimes against
humanity are crimes committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against civilian population. They do not
need to be related to war. On the other hand, a crime that has a
close relationship to the war will be a war crime. A crime com-
mitted in time of war will not automatically be a war crime if it
does not have a close relationship to the war. Crimes committed
by soldiers and related in nature to the war will be considered
war crimes.
Refugees that were massacred at No Gun Ri happened in
the middle of war as an official activity of U.S. forces. If the inci-
dent had had no relationship to war, it would merely have been a
case of crimes against humanity, but here, the massacre was com-
mitted by soldiers fighting in a war, and civilians were the sol-
dier's targets. Moreover, the civilians' deaths cannot be
accounted for without analyzing the broader wartime context.
With this view, it is reasonable to regard the incident as a war
crime. But defining the case as a war crime under international
humanitarian law is not so simple. Several complicated questions
are involved in analyzing the No Gun Ri incident.
The first problem is the time of entry into force of the
Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. Most
of the Geneva Conventions protecting civilians in general had
not been adopted at the time of the Massacre. The No Gun Ri
Massacre was committed in July 1950,and at that time, neither
the Rome Statute, 6 nor Protocols I and II to the Geneva Con-
ventions had been adopted. Even the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 did not come into force until October 1950.
The second problem is the obscurity of the codified regula-
tions. Most of the norms of international humanitarian laws
were aimed at regulation of the treatment of the wounded or the
captured. There is no specific regulation governing war crimes
against an ally's civilians, it is almost impossible to find an appro-
16. Rome Statute is still waiting for entry into force.
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priate clause that explicitly addresses the protection of allied
countries' civilian population like the No Gun Ri refugees in the
laws of war existing before 1950. To make matters worse, some
of the international treaties officially exclude allied countries'
civilians from protection. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
manifestly states, "Nationals of a co-belligerent State[ ] shall not
be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they
are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State
in whose hands they are."1
v
Thus, whether or not the No Gun Ri massacre is a war crime
under international humanitarian law is a very important analy-
sis. It is necessary to explain legitimately why it is a war crime if
we want to seek the appropriate remedies for the victims."8
This thesis' main purpose is supplying the victims of No Gun
Ri with a legal basis for their claims. Healing the past is not a
purely legal procedure. In a sense, it is a political and social pro-
cess. However, legal issues are the primary concern of this thesis.
The following questions will be discussed:
(1) What is the nature of the incident?
(2) Which laws were violated in Korea and in the United States?
(3) Is international humanitarian law applicable to this case?
(4) Does the incident constitute a war crime under customary
international law?
(5) What kinds of legal remedies are available for the victims?
(6) In the conclusion, the importance of the concept of war
crimes against allies' civilians will be reemphasized.
I. THE ANATOMY OF THE No GUN RI CASE
A. Summary of the Incident
1. The Korean War (1950-1953)
The Korean War broke out at 4:00 a.m. local time Sunday,
June 25, 1950. The North Korean troops had launched their
operation Storm. It was an all-out attack on the South without any
declaration of war. 19 Up to that point, the North and South had
17. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.
18. Similar analysis difficulties arose in the case of My Lai, Vietnam. See,
e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 126-53
(1970).
19. There is hot debate on the origin of the Korean War. North Korea
claimed that the invasion was committed by the South Korean Army. On the
other hand, the South Korean Government and the international community
believe that North Korea attacked South Korea without notice. Even in the
academic arena, the debate is still going on among the North Korean invasion
20011
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clashed some along the 38th parallel, but such an all-out surprise
attack was never expected by the Southern camp. 20 Because of
the superiority of North Korean military forces, Seoul fell within
three days.
The United States immediately appealed to the United
Nations (UN) Security Council to intervene, and the Security
Council adopted a resolution determining that the action consti-
tuted a "breach of the peace." 21 It called for the immediate ces-
sation of hostilities and called upon the authorities in North
Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th paral-
lel.22 On June 27, 1950, the Security Council recommended that
the members of the United Nations furnish the Republic of
Korea such assistance as may be necessary to repel the armed
attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area.23 Accordingly, President Harry Truman ordered the use of
U.S. planes and naval vessels against North Korean forces, and
on June 30th, U.S. ground troops were dispatched, arriving in
Pusan on July 1, 1950.
On July 7, 1950, the Security Council decided to place all
forces and assistance from Member States under the unified
command of the United States of America. This was the first
establishment of a UN military force. 24 Already head of the U.S.
military in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur was selected to
command the UN forces; on July 14th, Korean President
Syngman Rhee followed suit, giving MacArthur command over
theorists, South Korean invasion theorists, and the interaction between South
and North theorists.
20. The invasion, in a narrow sense, marked the beginning of a civil war
between peoples of a divided country. In a larger sense, the Cold War between
the Great Power blocs had erupted into open hostilities.
21. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1501
(1950).
22. This resolution has an important meaning in terms of keeping free-
dom and peace because it was the first time that the UN Security Council got
involved in such an issue to restore peace within a nation.
23. See S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1511
(1950).
24. Sixteen countries agreed to dispatch troops into Korea, and five other
countries offered medical aid. UN members sent 341,000 soldiers, including
one land troop, two other armies, nine divisions, three brigades, eight infantry
regiments, and their volunteers. In addition, two marine troops and three air
force troops were mobilized.
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the Korean army as well. 25 One man now commanded the U.S.
army, the Korean Army, and the UN troops.26
At first, U.S. troops were feeling quite confident about the
war. They had believed that their mere presence would frighten
away the North Korean troops 7.2  However, in their first encoun-
ter with North Korean People's Army on July 5, 1950, Task Force
Smith suffered a major defeat at Chukmaryong, North of Osan;
U.S. forces lost 150 out of 540 soldiers, and 72 were held hostage
by the North Korean army. Their only accomplishment was to
stall the North Korean army's southward march for six hours.
Taejeon was abandoned by the UN forces on July 20, 1950.
American soldiers lost their cocky attitude as the North Koreans
overran their first defensive positions. Early overconfidence was
displaced by the grim realization that the North Korean force was
superior. The North Korean army was larger and better
equipped, and the soldiers were better fighters.28
2. Three Night and Four Day Massacre
The No Gun Ri incident happened right at this moment. It
started on July 26, 1950 and continued until the morning of July
29th.29 According to the survivors, on July 23rd, the U.S. Army
25. On July 14, 1950 in Pusan, Korea, Syngman Rhee wrote to Gen. Mac-
Arthur. After acknowledging that General MacArthur had been placed in com-
mand of all UN military forces, President Syngman Rhee wrote, "I am happy to
assign to you command authority over all.., forces of the Republic of Korea
during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such
command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military com-
mander(s) . .. to whom you may delegate .... " Since that time, the command
authority over the Korean Army has belonged to the United States. JAMES F.
SCHNABEL, POLICY AND DIRECTrON: THE FIRST YEAR 112 (1992) (citing Rad, State
Dept. Msg. 41, U.S. Ambassador, Taegu, to Secretary of State, July 14, 1950,
containing text of Letter, from President Rhee to General MacArthur), available
at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/30-2/30-2-I.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2001).
26. Because of the status of the United States military command, the
responsibilities of the U.S. Government, the Korean Government, and the
United Nations can be raised together.
27. "'As soon as those North Koreans see an American uniform over
here,' soldiers boasted to one another, 'they'll run like hell.'" RuSSELL A.
GUGELER, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES: COMBAT AcrIONS IN KOREA 3 (1970).
28. Id.
29. The Associated Press brought this incident to the public's attention,
reporting that "American soldiers machine-gunned hundreds of helpless civil-
ians, under a railroad bridge in the South Korean countryside." Sang-Hun
Choe et al., Bridge at No Gun Ri, ASSOCIATED PRESS WIRE REPORT, Sept. 30, 1999,
available at http://wire.ap.org/Appackages/nogunri/story.html (fee for
retrieval). Except where otherwise indicated, the bulk of the factual recitations
describing the No Gun Ri incident were drawn from this report.
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ordered the villagers of Joo Gok Ri to vacate the village because
there might be combat. They evacuated and moved to Im Kye
Ri, located 1.5 miles south. Two days later, on July 25th, the U.S.
Army again ordered the villagers to move south toward Taegu or
Pusan. About 500 people from the two villages walked toward No
Gun Ri, being accompanied by U.S. troops. They stayed one
night at Ha Gi Ri and arrived at No Gun Ri on the morning of
July 26th. According to secret U.S. military intelligence reports
written during this period, when the refugees entered the under-
passes on July 26th, the North Korean fronfline was four miles
from No Gun Ri. "As the refugees neared No Gun Ri, leading ox
carts, some with children on their backs, American soldiers
ordered them off the southbound dirt road and onto a parallel
railroad track." 0
The killing reportedly began "when American planes sud-
denly swooped in and strafed an area where the white-clad refu-
gees were resting."3" The killing continued; "the American
soldiers directed the refugees into the bridge underpasses-each
80 feet long, 23 feet wide, 30 feet high-and after dark opened
fire on them from nearby machine-gun positions. Ex-GI, Her-
man Patterson said, 'It was just wholesale slaughter."'- 2
After speaking with superior officers by radio, Captain Mel-
bourne C. Chandler had ordered machine-gunners to set up
near the tunnel mouths and open fire. 3 The No Gun Ri survi-
vors assert that no hostile fire originated from the refugees under
the bridge.34 According to the Korean claimants, the soldiers
30. Id. Declassified records confirm that the First Cavalry Division
soldiers moved through that village area on this timeline. According to ex-ser-
geant George Preece's recollection, the way was being cleared for U.S. Army
vehicles. Id.
31. Id (both Koreans and ex-GIs reported this as the starting point).
Declassified U.S. Air Force mission reports from mid-1950 show that
pilots sometimes attacked 'people in white,' apparently because of sus-
picions North Korean soldiers were disguised among them. The
report for one mission of four F-80jets, for example, said the airborne
controller 'said to fire on people in white clothes. Were about 50 in
group.'
Id. In addition, CBS recently reported that they found an Air Force memo on
strafing of refugees dated July 25, 1950, which said that Air Force planes had
strafed columns of civilian refugees at the request of Army commanders. See
U.S. Studies Link Between Strafing Memo, No Gun Ri, THE WASHINGTON PosT, June
7, 2000, at A8.
32. Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
33. See id.
34. See id. Ex-sergeant James T. Kerns and others suggested the Ameri-
cans were answering fire from among the refugees. Eugene Hesselman of
Mitchell, Kentucky, minimized the gunfire, reporting that "'every now and then
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shot and killed those near the tunnel entrances first." Retired
Colonel Robert M. Carroll was a twenty-five-year-old first lieuten-
ant at the time of the massacre. He reports that battalion
riflemen opened fire on the refugees from their foxholes. Car-
roll, not convinced this was the enemy, got the rifle companies to
cease firing on the refugees.3 6 Believing it was safer under a
nearby double-arched concrete railroad bridge, Carroll then led
a boy to join a group of traumatized, confused, and wounded
Koreans gathered there.3 7 He did not perceive a threat. "'There
weren't any North Koreans in there the first day, I'll tell you that.
It was mainly women and kids and old men,' recalled Carroll,
who said he then left the area and knew nothing about what fol-
lowed.""8 During three nights under fire, at least 126 villagers
were killed and 45 were wounded according to the officially reg-
istered list of the victims' committee. 9 Reportedly, "some
trapped refugees managed to slip away, but others were shot as
they tried to escape or crawled out to find clean water to
drink."40 At the end of the incident, early on July 29, the 7th
Cavalry pulled back. Three weeks later, the North Korean news-
paper Cho Sun In Min Bo reported that "North Korean troops
who moved in found 'about 400 bodies of old and young people
and children.' "41
3. My Lai Massacre in Vietnam
At the My Lai Massacre, Captain Medina, who was prose-
cuted for ordering the massacre, testified that he instructed his
troops to destroy My Lai 4 by "burning the hutches. ... kill[ing]
the livestock .... close[ing] the wells and . . . destroy[ing] the
food crops."42 Lieutenant Calley testified that Captain Medina
you'd hear a shot, like a rifle shot.' But others recalled only heavy barrages of
American firepower, not hostile fire. 'I don't remember shooting coming out,'
said ex-rifleman Louis Allen of Bristol, Tenn." Id. The Koreans suggested the
American soldiers may have been seeing their own force's gunfire ricocheting
through from the tunnels' opposite ends. American soldiers confirmed this
possibility. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See No Gun Ri Victims Request that the US Government Should Apologize and
Compensate, KYUNc-HYANG NEWSPAPER, Mar. 4, 2000, available at http://www.ebo.
co.kr / wwwboard / CrazyWWWBoard.cgi?db = ebol4&mode = read&num = 70&
page=1&ftype=6&fval=&backdepth=1.
40. Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
41. Id.
42. 32 C.M.R. 1182 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
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informed the troops they were to kill every living thing.4 The
unit received no hostile fire from the village." Following orders,
the American soldiers fired at anything that moved.
Bunkers and huts were razed with grenades or raked with
machine gunfire. Women, young and old, were raped.
Some Vietnamese were shot as they stumbled out of their
huts; most were executed in large assembled groups. Den-
nis Conti, a minesweeper operator who was a participant
and an eyewitness to the massacre, recalled that women
and children were pushed into bunkers, and grenades
were thrown in after them. At one point when Conti was
alone, he forced a twenty-year-old Vietnamese woman with
a four year old child to perform oral sex upon him, while
he held a gun at the child's head, threatening to kill the
child. In the end, over 567 Vietnamese civilian men and
children were dead.45
Twelve officers and soldiers were charged with military-type
offenses and thirteen were charged with crimes under Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).46 The charges against seven of
those officers and enlisted men charged were dismissed, three
were acquitted, two were barred from reenlistment, and only
one, First Lieutenant William Calley, was found guilty of premed-
itated murder and other crimes under the UCMJ.
47
43. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
44. Id. at 1165.
45. Jeannine Davanzo, Note, An Absence of Accountability for the My Lai Mas-
sacre, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMp. 287, at 294 (1999). American philosopher
Michael Walzer declares, "[T]he American war in Vietnam was, first of all, an
unjustified intervention, and it was, secondly, carried on in so brutal a manner
that even had it initially been defensible, it would have to be condemned." See
Helen Fein, supra note 2.
46. Davanzo, supra note 45, at 295.
47. 1& at 298-99.
Although Calley was sentenced to a dismissal and confinement at hard
labor for life, the convening authority reduced this sentence to a dis-
missal and twenty years at hard labor. Subsequent to the convening
authority's action, the Secretary of the Army further reduced the sen-
tence to a dismissal and ten years at hard labor. William Calley, Jr.,
actually served a total of only three years under house arrest at Fort
Benning, Georgia, and six months at the confinement facility at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas (from June 1974 to November 1974). Calley was
released from confinement at Fort Leavenworth when his sentence
was overturned by a federal district judge in Georgia. When the fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the conviction, Calley was not
returned to confinement; instead, he was paroled by the Secretary of
the Army in 1975. He works today in his father-in-law's jewelry store in
Columbus, Georgia.
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Why, on earth, did these unbelievable incidents happen?
The official investigation report of the United States on the Mas-
sacre at My Lai points out six important reasons that caused the
incident in Vietnam to happen: (1) lack of proper training, (2)
dehumanizing attitude toward the Vietnamese, (3) nature of
enemy, (4) organizational problems, (5) lack of leadership, and
(6) the lack of a grand strategy by the United States.48
4. The Background of the Incident
Similar problems contributed to the Massacre at No Gun Ri.
First, the U.S. soldiers were poorly equipped, ill trained, and
had little understanding of Korea. These teenagers and young
officers lacked combat experience and had abruptly entered the
war just three days before.49 A rumor was circulating among the
U.S. ranks that North Korean soldiers masquerading as peasants
might try to penetrate American lines with refugees. The
soldiers were frightened and lacked the confidence to handle the
situation correctly.
Second, there was an official order from American ground
commanders to fire on refugees fearing that North Korean
soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes, were infiltrating refugee col-
umns, thus, posing a threat to U.S. forces. In the morning ofJuly
26, 1950:
[T] he U.S. 8th Army, which was in charge of Korea, had
radioed orders throughout the Korean front that began,
"No-repeat no-refugees will be permitted to cross battle
lines at any time," according to declassified documents
located at the National Archives in Washington. Two days
earlier, 1st Cavalry Division headquarters issued a more
explicit order: "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire
everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of
women and children." In the neighboring 25th Infantry
Division, the commander, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, told
his troops that since South Koreans were to have been
evacuated from the battle zone, "all civilians seen in this
area are to be considered as enemy and action taken
Major Jeffrey F. Addicott & Major William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anni-
versary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REv. 153, n.35
(1993).
48. See Addicott & Hudson, supra note 47, at 162-74 (citing WILLIAM R.
PEERS, THE My LAX INQUIRY (1979)); see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1.
49. See Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29. The factual information on
No Gun Ri in the following three paragraphs is drawn from this report.
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accordingly." His staff relayed this as "considered as
unfriendly and shot."5"
Finally, after speaking with superior officers by radio, Captain
Melbourne C. Chandler, ordered his soldiers to fire on the refu-
gees at No Gun Ri.
Third, the case was not reported to the appropriate authori-
ties nor was reparation offered. Consequently, subsequent simi-
lar incidents occurred during the Korean War.5 1
B. Current Situation
1. The Denial of Redress
The U.S. military and the Korean Government have denied
redress several times.52 Cheong Eun Yong, the chairperson of
50. Id.
51. Many claims of similar incidents were raised after the No Gun Ri Mas-
sacre. For example, reportedly several months after No Gun Ri, the Waegwan
Bridge was bombed, killing hundreds of refugees. Sang-hun Choe et al., Vets
Say Other Refugees Killed by GIs; On the Bridge Near Taegu During Early Korean War,
KOREA HERALD, Oct. 15, 1999, available at http:www//koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/
htmldir/1999/10/15/199910150041.asp.
52. Since the writing of this article, both the U.S. and Korean Govern-
ments have completed their investigations and released official review reports.
The U.S. report concluded, "As a result of U.S. actions during the Korean
War in the last week ofJuly 1950, Korean civilians were killed and injured in the
vicinity of No Gun Ri." United States Review Report, Department of the Army
Inspector Genera4 No Gun Ri Review, January 2001, available at http://
www.army.mil/nogunri/. However, it adds:
[G]iven the fact that many of the U.S. soldiers lacked combat-exper-
ienced officers and Non-commissioned officers, some soldiers may
have fired out of fear in response to a perceived enemy threat without
considering the possibility that they might be firing on Korean civil-
ians. Neither the documentary evidence nor the U.S, veterans' state-
ments reviewed by the U.S. Review Team support a hypothesis of
deliberate killing of Korean civilians.
Id. On the other hand, the Korean Review team declared, "In the desperate
opening weeks of defensive combat in the Korean War, U.S. soldiers killed or
injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees in the last week of July
1950 during a withdrawal under pressure in the vicinity of No Gun Ri." Id. The
Korean report was published as a book. No GUN Ri INVESTIGATION TEAM, A
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY ON THE No GUN Ri INCIDENT (2001).
After the release of the reports, former President Clinton expressed, "the
United States' deepest sorrow, regret, and sympathy to the survivors and the
victims' families for the events that transpired at No Gun Ri, and for their
anguish during their long effort to gain acknowledgment of that tragedy."
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced, "As a 'symbol of deep
regret' over the tragedy, the United States promised to erect a memorial in the
vicinity of No Gun Ri." He also promised that the United States would establish
a scholarship fund, which the United States and the Republic of Korea have
agreed to name the "United States-Republic of Korea Commemorative Scholar-
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the Victims' Committee, and other victims filed a compensation
claim with a U.S. claims office in Seoul in October 1960, but it
was dismissed because of insufficient evidence and the statute of
limitations.5" In December 1960, July 1994, and October 1994,
they also sent the U.S. Government complaints requesting both
an apology and compensation; they received no answer.5 4 Addi-
tional complaints were sent to President Clinton in July 1994 and
October 1994; these also went unanswered.55 When the victims
sent complaints to President Kim Young Sam in July 1994 and
October 1994, they received notice that their complaints had
been transferred to the U.S. forces claims office.5 6 However, the
United States Army office was essentially non-responsive, stating
that the U.S. does not assume responsibility in the case of dam-
ages caused by combatant activities against the enemy. 7 The
answer reportedly was a final decision and the last response to the
case.
In August 1997, thirty petitioners signed and filed a claim
with the South Korean Government Compensation Committee.58
Having researched various military positions, they pointed a fin-
ger at the 1st Cavalry. United States Armed Forces Claims Ser-
vice responded, stating there was "no evidence . . . to show that
the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was in the area."59 A lower-level
South Korean compensation committee acknowledged people
were killed beneath the railroad bridge but found no proof of
U.S. involvement.6' In April 1998, the national panel rejected
the case, saying a five-year statute of limitations had expired long
ago.6" Now, victims are seeking remedies directly in the U.S.
judiciary and are reportedly planning to file a petition to the UN
ship." See United States Department of Defense, News Release: Secretary of
Defense Statement on No Gun Ri, January 11, 2001, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan200l/b01112001_btOl7-01 .html.
53. No Gun Ri Chronology, CHUNG CHONG DAILY NEWS, September 30,
1999.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Korean claimants assert that the killings were not combat-related,
because the enemy was miles away. See Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. "The A[ssociated] P[ress] subsequently reconstructed unit
movements from map coordinates in declassified war records. They showed
that four 1st Cavalry Division battalions were in the area at the time of the
alleged incident." Id.
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Human Rights Committee.6 2 The chairperson of the Victims
Committee, Cheong, urges that the investigation and compensa-
tion should be made while the elderly victims are alive, and he
suggests that the Korean Government can compensate the vic-
tims first and then claim indemnity from the United States.
2. Investigations
After the Associate Press published their investigation into No
Gun Ri,6" the Clinton Government announced its decision to
conduct an official investigation of the case.6 4 On September 30,
1999, the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen ordered the
Army to undertake a new and thorough review of reports that
American soldiers killed Korean civilians at the beginning of the
Korean War.6 5 Korean President Kim Dae Jung also ordered his
Government to investigate the case thoroughly in co-operation
with the U.S. Government, and to find remedies for the victims,
such as compensation.6 6 Even though the investigation is under-
way after the report, neither government mentions even a word
regarding the remedies.6 7 The only thing the governments
repeatedly say is, "investigation first, then remedies."6
Recently, there has been hot debate whether the testimony
of Edward L. Dailey is credible or not.6 9 As a part of the investi-
gation, the links between the Air Force memo on strafing of refu-
gees and the No Gun Ri incident are being researched.7" In
62. See Planning to file a petition in the UN Human Rights Committee, No Gun
Ri Attorney Says, DONG-A ILBo DAILY, June 15, 2000, available at http://www.
ebo.co.kr/wwwboard/CrazyWWWBoard.cgi?db=ebol4&mode=read&num=
84&page=l &ftype=6&fval=&backdepth=1.
63. See generally Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
64. See Letter from the former President William J. Clinton to Army Sec-
retary Louis Caldera (September 30, 1999), available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/aug99/clin3O.htm [hereinafter Caldera
Letter].
65. Elizabeth Becker, US to Revisit Accusations of a Massacre by GI's in '50,
N.Y. TIMES, October 1, 1999, at A3; see also Caldera Letter, supra note 64.
66. Id. Kim DaeJung even suggested ajoint investigation committee, but
was not successful. After the diplomatic negotiation, a Bilateral Coordinating
Group was established between the two countries. Chang-Sik Park, Cloud on the
Bridge, I-LNGEORE 21, Oct. 28, 1999, at 28.
67. See supra note 52.
68. Soon-goo Hwang, After the No Gun Ri Case, HANGYEORE 21, Jan. 20,
2000, at 28.
69. He recently reversed his testimony on the massacre, saying that he
might not have been at the site, and that he might have heard the story from his
colleague soldiers, who had seen the incident. See Felicity Barringer, Ex-GI in
A.P. Account Concedes He Didn't See Korea Massacre, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2000. For
more recent information, see supra, note 52.
70. CBS reported on June 6, 2000:
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addition, there are elements of the No Gun Ri episode that are
still unclear. As posed by the Associated Press, "What chain of
officers gave open-fire orders? Did GIs see gunfire from the refu-
gees or their own ricochets? How many soldiers refused to fire?7"
How high in the ranks did knowledge of the events extend?"7"
Those questions should be answered by the investigations of the
two governments and judicial agencies.73
C. Legal Issues Raised
It is undeniable that more than one hundred Korean refu-
gees were machine-gunned to death by U.S. soldiers. Clear evi-
dence, including the testimony of the victims and ex-GI's,
confirm that refugees were killed illegally at No Gun Ri. The full
and precise facts will be disclosed after the official investiga-
tion.74 Nevertheless, the following facts can safely be concluded
from the reports and evidence already known:
(1) There were mass killings at No Gun Ri by U.S. Soldiers on
July 26, 27, and 28, 1950;
(2) The soldiers fired on the refugees knowing that there were
civilians in the refugee group who were not combatants;
Army investigators, searching for the truth of what really happened,
have found an Air Force document that had been buried for decades
at the National Archives, a memo by Air Force Colonel Turner Rogers,
reads in part, 'The Army has requested that we strafe all civilian refu-
gee parties . . . approaching our positions. . . . To date, we have
complied.'
See Order to Fire on Civilians? (CBS television broadcast, June 6, 2000) at http://
www.wbz.com/now/story/0,1597,202826-364,00.shtml. The so-called Rogers
Memo clearly shows that air strafing on civilians was widely conducted by the
U.S. Air Forces at the early stage of the Korean War. However, the U.S. review
report does not admit this memo as concrete evidence of air strafing in No Gun
Ri. See supra note 52.
71. "Not everyone fired, veterans said. 'Some of us did and some of us
didn't,' said Veteran Delos Flint, of Clio, Mich., [a] soldier who had been
briefly caught in the culvert with the refugees ... . 'It was Civilians just trying to
hide.'" Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 52. Problems identified at the beginning of the U.S.
Government investigation linger to criticize the product-report: (i) The victims
were not a party to the investigation, but were merely objects of the investiga-
tion; (ii) There was no neutral party to guarantee the impartiality of the com-
mittee; (iii) The power and the responsibility of the committee was not clearly
enumerated; (iv) The relationship between the investigation and the legal rem-
edy was not specified. See Sihyun Cho, An Opinion on the Correct Response to
the Civilian Massacres Committed by the United States Forces Such As No Gun
Ri (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
74. These governmental investigations have recently been completed. See
generally supra note 52.
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(3) The firing was supported by the superiors' orders and the
declaration: "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire at eve-
ryone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women
and children."75
The facts propose several legal questions:
(1) What is the nature of the incident? Which law was specifi-
cally violated in the incident? Is it a simple murder case?
Otherwise, does it constitute a crime against humanity or a
war crime? A specific legal explanation is necessary in order
to seek the legal remedy.
(2) Who is responsible for the incident? Individual responsibil-
ity of the U.S. Army will not be denied under the interna-
tional law. There is no doubt that the U.S. Government is
officially responsible for this incident, too. Moreover, the
Korean Government should be responsible, too, because
Korean President Syngman Rhee transferred command
authority over the Korean army to General MacArthur. In
addition, considering General MacArthur's position as the
Chief Commander of UN Forces, the United Nations may
incite responsibility for the UN as well.7 6
(3) How can No Gun Ri be compensated? It is a basic principle
of international human rights law to hold perpetrators of
massive human rights violations accountable. The UN Char-
ter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantee
"respect for and observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms."7 7 The Universal Declaration also states, "Eve-
ryone has the right to an effective remedy by competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law." 78 Since Nurem-
berg, it is an established norm that "any person who commits
an act which constitutes a crime under international law is
responsible therefore and liable to punishment."79 It is a
duty of nations under customary international law to investi-
gate and prosecute war crimes, genocide, torture, and
crimes against humanity.
The experience of the transition from the military dictator-
ships to democratic regimes in the 1980s and 1990s has helped to
theorize the principles of the accountability for past human
75. Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
76. The responsibility of the United Nations is outside the scope of this
thesis.
77. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A
(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also U.N. CARTER, Pmbl..
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 77, at art. 8.
79. Report of the I.L.C., supra note 6, at 98.
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rights abuses.80 In general, the victims, individuals, and society
as a whole have: (1) a right to see justice done, (2) a right to
know the truth, (3) an entitlement to compensation and non-
monetary forms of restitution, and (4) a right to a new institu-
don." In other words, the principles of international human
rights law request completion of the following tasks: (1) investi-
gation, prosecution, and punishment of the perpetrators; (2) dis-
closure to the victims, their families, and society of all that can be
reliably established about those events; (3) an offerance of ade-
quate reparations to the victims; and (4) separation of known
perpetrators from law enforcement bodies and other positions of
authority.
82
More than one hundred people were killed and many more
were wounded by U.S. soldiers' firing at No Gun Ri. Survivors
have suffered physical and emotional distress since the massacre
happened. Consequently, they are entitled to all of the upper
mentioned rights: to see justice done, to know the truth, to com-
pensation, and to a new institution. 3
II. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANrrARIAN LAW
A. The Hague Conventions
The major conventions that constitute international human-
itarian law are the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conven-
tions. The purpose of the Hague Conventions is to regulate "the
conduct of hostilities"; the Geneva Conventions focus on the "vic-
tims of war." The two sets of Conventions are closely related, but
the roots of each are quite different.
The Hague Convention (II), Convention with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, was adopted at the First Hague
Peace Conference of 1899. The Convention and the Regulations
were revised at the Second International Peace Conference in
80. SeeJuan E. Mendez, Accountability for the Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q.
255 (1997). "[A]ccountability for past abuses must be considered not only in
transitions to democracy, but in seeking solutions to armed conflicts as well."
Id. at 257.
81. Id. at 261. Louis Joinet raises three rights instead of four as victims
rights: (i) the right to know, (ii) the right to justice, and (iii) the right to repara-
tion. See generally Louis Joinet, The Administration ofJustice and the Human Rights
of Detainees, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1996).
82. Even though this is the case for the internal human rights violations,
these rights may be used in grave breaches of international humanitarian law as
well.
83. The right to a new institution will include the specific codification of
war crime against ally civilians to prohibit the recurrence of similar cases.
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1907, resulting in Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land.
The provisions of the Hague Conventions on land warfare,
like most of the substantive provisions of the Conventions of
1899 and 1907, are considered as embodying rules of customary
international law. The Nuremberg International Military Tribu-
nal stated that by 1939 the rules "were recognized by all civilized
nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and
customs of war."84
The first question with regard to the application of the
Hague Conventions is whether the Hague Conventions (II) and
(IV) were effective at the time of the No Gun Ri incident in 1950.
Korea signed the Hague Conventions (II) of 1899 in 1903; never-
theless, it never signed the Convention (IV) of 1907. The United
States signed both of the Conventions in 1899. The answer is
that Korea was under the protection of the Conventions, because
Regulations of the Hague Conventions were considered custom-
ary international law. It is also customary international law that
the laws of war that rise to the status of customary norms are
binding on the States that are not formally parties to the
Conventions. 5
TABLE 1: THE EFFECT OF THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AT THE TiME
OF THE No GUN Ri INCIDENT, JULY 1950
Effective Date of Signature Date of Signature Effect at the time
Convention by Korea by U.S. of No Gun Ri
(Ratification)
Convention (II) of March 17, 1903 July 29, 1899 Effective
1899 (April 9, 1902) (Customary
International Law)
Convention (IV) of Not Signed October 18, 1907 Effective
1907 (November 27, (Customary
1909) International Law)
84. DIETRIcH SCHINDLER &JiRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLIcrs 63
(1988). In 1946, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal stated with
regard to the Hague Convention on land warfare of 1907, "The rules of land
warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over
existing international law at the time of their adoption . . . but by 1939 these
rules . . . were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being
declaratory of the laws and customs of war." International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg),Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM.J. INT'L
L. 172, 248-49 (1947). In 1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East similarly declared that the 1907 Hague Convention was "good evidence of
the customary law of nations." See id.
85. Id. at 63.
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The second question is whether the Hague Conventions pro-
tect civilians, as well as wounded soldiers and prisoners of war. It
is very important to note that the Preamble of the Hague Con-
vention explicitly dealt with the protection of populations. The
Convention states in the Preamble, "[T]hese provisions, the
wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the
evils of war so far as military necessities permit, are destined to
serve as general rules of conduct for belligerents in their rela-
tions with each other and with populations."86 Another similar
notion in regard of the protection of the civilian is found later in
the Preamble. "[Plpulations and belligerents remain under the
protection and empire of the principles of international law, as
they result from the usages established between civilized nations,
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience." 7 These statements can be understood as the legal
basis for the application of the Hague Conventions to the case of
No Gun Ri.
Clauses in the Hague Conventions can be used to criminal-
ize the action of U.S. soldiers at No Gun Ri. According to Article
23 of the Hague Convention (II) and (IV), it is forbidden: (b) to
kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army; and (c) to kill or wound an enemy who, having
laid down arms, or having no longer means of defense, has sur-
rendered at discretion. Furthermore, Article 43 poses the obliga-
tions to the occupant, when "the authority of the legitimate
power" passes to them, to take all steps in his power to re-estab-
lish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country. Article 46 of Convention (II) guarantees "family hon-
our and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well
as religious convictions and practice." The refugees of No Gun
Ri carried no arms and were totally under the control of the U.S.
soldiers when they arrived at the massacre site. Accordingly, U.S.
soldiers should not have fired on the refugees, even if they might
have suspected the presence of disguised North Korean soldiers
among them.
However, the third question arises at this point. There is a
problem in applying the clauses of the Hague Conventions to the
No Gun Ri case directly. The concept of "hostile territory" is the
question. The articles cited above are under the title of "On mili-
86. Hague Convention (II), supra note 9, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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tary authority over hostile territory."8 8 Is it correct to apply the
section to the case of an "allied country's civilians"? Can it be
considered that the No Gun Ri area in South Korea was "hostile
territory,"89 or the "territory of the hostile state"?9° Can it be
safely construed that the area was an "occupied territory"?91
Unfortunately, it seems to be impossible to consider No Gun Ri
as a "hostile territory." Article 41 of The Laws of War on Land:
Manual published by the Institute of International Law (Oxford Man-
ual) states, "Territory is regarded as occupied when, as the conse-
quence of invasion by hostile forces, the State to which it belongs
has ceased, in fact, to exercise its ordinary authority therein, and
the invading State is alone in a position to maintain order
there."92 According to this definition, the territory of Korea at
the time of the No Gun Ri incident can never be an occupied
territory of the United States.
This problem even more clearly arises in the case of Geneva
Convention (IV), Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian
Persons In Time Of War Of 1949. Article 4 of the Convention
explicitly refuses to protect the civilian population of the neutral
or allied countries. It states, "Nationals of a neutral State who
find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nation-
als of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected
persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they
are."
93
In any codification of law, there is always the risk that the
document will not be adequate to cover all the potential issues
that might arise. However, from the viewpoint of the civilians of
allied countries, such as South Korean nationals during the
Korean War and South Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam
War, the obscurity of or the defects in the codification cause a
88. Hague Convention (II), supra note 9, at § III. Section III of the
Hague Convention (IV) carries the title of "Military Authority over the Territory
of the Hostile State." Hague Convention (IV), supra note 7, at § III.
89. Hague Convention (II), supra note 9, at § III.
90. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 7, at § III.
91. Hague Convention (II), supra note 9, at art. 44; Hague Convention
(IV), supra note 7, at art. 44.
92. The Laws of War on Land, Sept. 9, 1880, reprinted in SCHINDLER &
ToMAN, supra note 84, at 42 (originally published by the Institute of Interna-
tional Law).
93. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4. The problem of
the Geneva Convention (IV) in protecting the civilians was solved in general by
Protocol I. See Protocol II, supra note 11. The problem of The Geneva Conven-
tions in the protection of the allied countries' civilians will be discussed later
again.
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very disappointing and painful situation for them. What is the
alternative for the No Gun Ri victims? The solution is located in
the Preamble of the Hague Conventions-the "Martens Clause."
Perhaps, it is the most important provision of the Hague
Conventions.94
The Preamble of the Hague Convention states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages estab-
lished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of the public conscience."
In other words, in cases not covered by this Protocol or by
other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of interna-
tional law derived from established custom; from the principles
of military necessity, humanity, chivalry, proportionality and dis-
tinction; and from the dictates of public conscience.96 "The Mar-
tens Clause grants combatants and non-combatants protection
under generally accepted principles of international law, not
only those peculiar to the law of war. More importantly, it gives
custom an elevated status in the law of war."97 The Preamble of
the Hague Convention supplies us with a solid legal basis in the
application of international humanitarian law and customs of
war to the case of No Gun Ri and the war crimes against allied
countries' civilians. The Massacre of No Gun Ri constitutes a war
crime in light of the Preamble of the Hague Convention and
under customary international law.
94. In United States v. Krupp, the court stated, "[The Martens Clause] is
much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages
established among civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of
public conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific
provisions of the [Hague] Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do
not cover specific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare."
KWAKWA, supra note 8, at 13 (citing United States v. Krupp, 9 Trials War Crim.
1341 (Nur. Mil. Trib. 1949)).
95. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 6, at Pmbl. . This Martens
Clause has stood the test of time and is reproduced in almost identical terms in
Article I of Protocol I of 1977.
96. See L. C. Green, Essays on the Modem Law of War 216 (1985).
97. KWAKWA, supra note 8, at 13.
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B. Geneva Conventions
The so-called Geneva Conventions have a long history. The
first Geneva Convention was adopted in 1864 after the Geneva
Conference for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in War.98 The Convention of 1864 was replaced by the
Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929, and 1949 on the same sub-
ject. "However, the Convention of 1864 ceased to have effect
only in 1966 when the last state party to it (South Korea) which
had not yet acceded to a later Convention, acceded to the Con-
ventions of 1949." 99 Two protocols were additionally adopted in
1977, in order to cover internal armed conflicts and the conduct
of hostilities. I" °
TABLE 2: THE EFFECT OF GENEVA CONVENTIONS AT THE TIME OF
THE No GUN RI INCIDENT, JULY 1950
Effective Date of Date of Signature Effect at the time
Convention Effectuation in by U.S. of No Gun Ri
Korea (Ratification)
(Ratification)
Geneva January 8, 1903 March 1, 1882 Effective
Convention of
1864
Geneva Not signed July 6, 1906 Effective
Convention of (February 9, 1907)
1906
Geneva Not Signed July 27, 1929 Effective
Convention of (February 4, 1932)
1929
Geneva August 16, 1966 August 12, 1949 Not effective
Convention (I), (July 11, 1966) (August 2, 1953) (Effectuated only
(II), (III), and after October
(IV) of 1949 1950)
Protocol (I) and January 15, 1982 Not signed Not effective
Protocol(II) to the (February 14,
Geneva 1981)
Convention of
1977
Korea signed and ratified the Convention of 1864, Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field on January 8, 1903, but is not a signatory to the Conven-
tion of 1929. It did not sign the four Conventions until 1966.
On the other hand, United States was a signatory to the 1864,
98. See SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 84, at 279.
99. Id.
100. The two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
embodied and developed the rules embodied in the Regulations of the Hague
Conventions.
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1906, and 1929 Conventions. In addition, it signed the 1949
Geneva Conventions on December 8, 1949, ratifying it on Febru-
ary 8, 1955.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 entered into force in
October 1950, three months after the No Gun Ri Massacre.101
The three previous Geneva Conventions have no specific
provisions with regard to the protection of civilians. The Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field of 1864 was effective at the time of No Gun Ri. The focus
of the Convention was the "wounded or sick combatants." Arti-
cle 6 of the Convention states, "Wounded or sick combatants, to
whatever nation they may belong, shall be collected and cared
for." However, there is no provision that regulates the killings of
civilians. The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field of 1906 was more detailed
and more precise in its terminology than the Convention of
1864. New provisions were included concerning the burial of the
dead and the transmission of information. The Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field of 1929 inserted new provisions to the Convention of 1906
concerning the protection of medical aircraft and the use of the
distinctive emblem in time of peace. It was based on the experi-
ence of World War I. It is impossible to find any special provi-
sions on the protection of civilians in the early versions of the
Geneva Conventions.
1. The Development of the Protection of Civilians
The concept of the protection of civilians during the wars
was codified very recently. The Convention (MV) Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, signed at Geneva on
August 12, 1949, was the first Convention that contained the enu-
merated clauses to protect the civilians in time of war. Since the
traditional laws of war were focused on the methods or means of
war, or combatant victims of war, the war crimes against civilians
were generally dealt with under the common law or customs of
war. Only the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 contain
"some provisions concerning the protection of populations
against the consequences of war and their protection in occu-
pied territories. "102
After World War I, the International Red Cross Conferences
of 1929 took the first steps towards constructing supplementary
rules protecting civilians during war. The 1929 Diplomatic Con-
101. See TABLE 2, supra Part II(B).
102. SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 84, at 495.
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ference, which revised the Convention on the Wounded and Sick and
drew up the Convention on Prisoners of War, recommended that
studies should be undertaken, working toward concluding a con-
vention on the protection of civilians in both enemy and enemy-
occupied territory. In Tokyo in 1934, the International Red
Cross Conference approved a Draft Convention prepared by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. l"' On June 21, 1938,
the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, stated in the
House of Commons that three principles of international law
were applicable to warfare from the air. He declared, "Any
attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in
such a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not
bombed through negligence."104 When the Assembly of the
League of Nations met in the following autumn, it adopted with-
out dissent the resolution, Protection of Civilian Populations against
Bombing from the Air In Case of War.
After World War II, the four Geneva Conventions were
adopted. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War of 1949 was the first one that contained provisions
for civilians. It "may be regarded as a manifesto of human rights
for civilians during armed conflict."1"5
The purpose of the Fourth [Geneva] Convention was to
prevent a repetition of the situation resulting from the
Nazi occupation of Europe during the Second World War,
when nationals of the occupied territories were subjected
by their countries' enemy to every form of indignity and
cruelty known to man. The Convention's provisions are
intended to ensure that civilian nationals of a party to a
conflict... preserve their dignity as human beings and, to
the extent possible in view of the war situation, retain and
enjoy those rights which are normally considered as
belonging to human beings, regardless of race, nationality,
sex, political belief, or any other special characteristic. 10 6
2. The Problem of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention (IV)
However, there is a serious defect in the Fourth Geneva
Convention in regard of the protection of the allied country's
civilians. It clearly states in Article 4, "Nationals of a neutral State
103. See id.
104. See also Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing from the
Air In Case of War, art. 1(3), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TomAN, supra note 84, at
162.
105. GREEN, supra note 96, at 94.
106. Id. at 95.
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who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and
nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as pro-
tected persons while the State of which they are nationals has
normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands
they are."1 0 7 Under this provision, the "nationals of a neutral
State" and "nationals of a co-belligerent State" are not protected.
The Civilians Convention only protects non-nationals in the
hands of an occupying power. Despite all the talks about the
importance of human rights, and despite the knowledge of what
happened, for example, to German dissidents and "undesirables"
during the Second World War, nationals only enjoy the limited
protection afforded them by other international agreements on
the preservation of human rights to which their home State may
be a party.1
0 8
During the Korean War, South Korea was a co-belligerent
State to the United States, and it had normal diplomatic repre-
sentation in the United States. Consequently, Korean civilians
were not protected under the Geneva Convention (IV). 'Only the
latter part of the Article that says, "[t] he provisions of Part II are,
however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13" will be
effective for the allied countries' civilians. Article 13 of the
Geneva Convention (IV) states, "The provisions of Part II cover
the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without
any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality,
religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the
sufferings caused by war." However, the provisions in the section
(Art. 13-26) contain no compulsory regulations except for the
protection of children (Art. 24) and correspondence between
family members (Art.25). The Geneva Convention (VI) did not
succeed in protecting all civilian populations.' 09
3. Protocol (I) and Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions
(1977)
The defect of the coverage of the civilians of neutral and
allied countries was generally resolved in the Protocol Additional
To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, and Relating To The
Protection Of Victims Of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
which was signed in 1977.110 It contains an article that extends
the definition of civilians and civilian population. If one is not
107. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.
108. See GREEN, supra note 96, at 98.
109. See CH.ARsS A. SHANOR & TIMOTHY P. TERRELL, MILITARY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 204-05 (1980).
110. See Protocol I, supra note 11. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
was especially intended to include the non-international armed conflicts.
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manifestly a combatant, he or she will be considered a civilian."'
Article 51 of the Protocol declares that the civilian population
and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against
dangers arising from military operations."' It also says, "The
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack.""' Especially, Part IV of Protocol I is
devoted to Civilian Population. Article 48 states as a basic rule,
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian pop-
ulation and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combat-
ants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives."' 14 This is the embodiment of the idea of the Hague
Conventions.
Article 72 of the Protocol (I) has very important meaning. It
states:
The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules
concerning humanitarian protection of civilians and civil-
ian objects in the power of a Party to the conflict contained
in the Fourth Convention, particularly Parts I and III
thereof, as well as to other applicable rules of international
law relating to the protection of fundamental human
rights during international armed conflict." 5
This provision manifestly acknowledges the relationship
between international humanitarian law and international
human rights law. It shows that the gap between the two groups
of international laws is merging to one body gradually." 6
Protocol I guarantees in Art. 75(1) that "persons who are in
the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from
more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this
Protocol shall be treated humanely." 1 7 It also states, "The fol-
111. See id. at art. 50(1).
112. See id. at art. 51(1).
113. Id. at art. 51(2).
114. Id. at art. 48.
115. Id. at art. 72.
116. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NuTr-
SHELL 167 (1988).
117. Protocol I, supra note 11, at art. 75 (1). The full text of art. 75 (1) is
as follows:
In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of
this Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict
and who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the
Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all
circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided
by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour,
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lowing acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by mili-
tary agents: (a) Violence to the life, health, or physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular: (i) Murder; (ii) Torture of all
kinds, whether physical or mental."11
Under these provisions, the No Gun Ri massacre is clearly a
war crime. The soldiers who fired on the refugees and the super-
iors who permitted the machine-gunning of them should be pun-
ished accordingly. However, Protocol (I) came into force in
1978. Moreover, the United States refused to sign the Protocols
because of the extension of the coverage to include internal con-
flicts.119 In this regard, Protocol I cannot be used as the legal
instrument governing the No Gun Ri case. However, it can be
used as evidence of a rule of customary international law.
4. Applying the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the No Gun
Ri Case
In 1949, the Geneva Convention (I), (II), (III), and (IV)
were adopted at the same time: (1) Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field of
August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention I); (2) Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention II);
(3) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar cri-
teria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and
religious practices of all such persons.
118. Id. at art. 75(2).
119. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEw RuLES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CON-
FLICrs: COMMISSION ON THE Two 1977 PROTOcOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949 440 (1982). The U.S. Government argued that Protocol
I is "fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed" and "contained provisions which
would 'undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war.'" KWAKWA,
supra note 8, at 26 (citing Letter of Transmittal from former President Reagan,
Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Covenentions, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No.
2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, 1987, reprinted in 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 910 (1987)).
The attitude of the United States is, recently, changing. For example, an
instruction issued by the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff states that
the "Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during
the conduct of all military operations and related activities in armed conflict,
however such conflicts are characterized." Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Instruction 5810.01, Implementation of the Department of Defense Law of War
Program (1996), quoted in Major Corn, When Does the Law of War Apply: Analysis
of Department of Defense Policy on Application of the Law of War, ARMY LAW., June
1998, at 17.
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August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention III); (4) Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949
(Geneva Convention V).12°  The Conventions achieved great
improvement in the protection of victims of war. However, there
are barriers to the application of those Conventions to the No
Gun Ri case.
First, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were not enacted at
the time of the No Gun Ri incident. Even though the texts of the
Conventions were adopted on August 12, 1949, the date of entry
in force was on October 12, 1950, three months after the No Gun
Ri Incident. This is an inherent barrier to the application of the
Convention to the case.
Second, the United States did not ratify the Geneva Conven-
tions at the time of No Gun Ri. It signed the Conventions on
August 12, 1949, but ratified them on August 2, 1955.121 This
means that the United States only has the obligation to "refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the
Conventions in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties.122 The Vienna Convention is generally considered "a codifi-
cation of the existing customary international law." 123 The
United States also recognizes the Vienna Convention as "the
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice," 2 4 even
though it has not ratified it until now. However, the opinion of
scholars are not uniform on the issue of whether Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention is a rule of customary international law, even
if the PCIL, in 1926, had decided that the abuses of the rights
before the ratification of a treaty would be in violation of the
120. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 10; Second Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 10; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 10.
121. The fact that Korea was not a signatory to the Convention is not a
problem, because the "general participation clause" was expelled from the
international humanitarian law after the Hague Convention and Common Arti-
cle 2 explicitly codified the principle.
122. "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to
the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending
the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not
unduly delayed." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27.
123. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 (3d
ed. 1999).
124. Id. at 114.
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obligation of the treaty. 12 In this regard, it is difficult to declare
that the Geneva Conventions were legally binding on the United
States at the time of the No Gun Ri incident.
Third, as stated above, Geneva Conventions do not contain
any specific provision regarding war crimes against allied coun-
tries' civilians. To make matters worse, the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention manifestly excluded the nationals of a neutral State and
nationals of a co-belligerent State from its protection of civilian
population. 126 The so-called Common Article 3 of the Conven-
tions states, "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, deten-
tion, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely."1 27 However, there is the precondition, "in the case
of armed conflict not of international character," which cannot
be the expression of the relationship between the United States
and Korea. The nature of the Korean War might arguably be
described as a civil war at the starting point of the war.128 Never-
theless, the character of the Korean War was completely changed
into an international war after the U.S. and the UN armies inter-
vened.' 29 Consequently, it cannot be construed that Common
Article 3 regulates the case of war crimes against allied countries'
civilians. It can only be used as a basis to infer the intention of
the framers. The clause guarantees the "minimum" protection
in the case of armed conflict not of an international character.
Since the term, "not of an international" character was added on
125. See SEOK-YONG LEE, INTERNATIONAL LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE 179
(1995). On the other hand, in 1926, PCIJ decided that the abuses of the rights
before the ratification of a treaty would be in violation of the obligation of the
treaty.
126. Fouth Geneva Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.
127. See id.
128. Regulation of civil war has been left to the discretion of the sover-
eign entity in which the conflict occurs because of the concept of national sov-
ereignty. SHANOR & TERRELL, supra note 109, at 185. Some scholars assert that
the Korean War was a civil war. However, they do not negate the international
character of the war, either. In the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong was fighting a
"national liberation war." However, the war was also defined as an international
war.
129. The conflict in Afghanistan, for example, was "an international con-
flict because there was a foreign occupation there-it makes no difference that
the foreign forces were invited by the Afghan 'government'." The mujahidin
was engaged in an international conflict not because it was fighting a "'war of
national liberation,' but because there was a foreign (Soviet) occupation there."
KwAKWA, supra note 8, at 47 (quoting W. Michael Reisman, The Resistance in
Afghanistan is Engaged in a War of National Liberation, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 906, 908
(1987)).
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the presumption that international conflicts would have 'more'
protections than non-international conflicts, not less, there is no
reason not to apply the minimum standard to the case of interna-
tional armed conflicts.
In short, the Geneva Conventions are not sufficient instru-
ments to regulate the acts of the U.S. soldiers at No Gun Ri,
because of: (1) the date of entry into force, (2) the absence of
ratification of the United States, and (3) the obscurity of the pro-
visions. Yet, they can be used as evidence of the expanding pro-
tection of civilians under international humanitarian law.
Although the codification of the protection of allied countries'
civilians was not satisfactory in the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the Conventions indirectly show that the killing of civilian popu-
lations is not allowed under the laws or customs of war. These
Conventions provide strong evidence supporting the fact that the
No Gun Ri incident was in violation of the laws or customs of
war.
C. The Pinciples of Customary International Law
According to Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, one of the primary sources of interna-
tional law is "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law."13° In addition, the "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations" are another source of
international law.'
The law of war is defined as a "branch of international law
prescribing the principles and usages which, in time of war, gov-
ern the status and relations of enemies, persons under military
government or martial law, and persons resident in the theatre of
war."132 Large part of laws of war have been embodied in treaties
or conventions. However, there are still many unwritten laws of
war-namely, customs and basic principles of the law of war.' 33
Restatement Section 102 states that customary law, as well as law
made by international agreement, have equal authority as inter-
national law.'3 4 Additionally, the force of customary interna-
130. Statue of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
131. Id. atart. 38(1)(c).
132. DANIEL WALKER, MILITARY LAW 520 (1954).
133. In order for the practices to be customary law, two basic elements
are necessary: "practice of states" and "opinio juris." LINDA MALONE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: THE PROFESSOR SERIES 30-31 (2nd. 1998).
134. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 123, at 145 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §102 cmt. (j)).
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tional law has been recognized in the United States Army Field
Manual, which states:
The unwritten or customary law of war is binding upon all
nations .... The customary law of war is part of the law of
the United States, and, insofar as it is not inconsistent with
any treaty to which this country is a party or with a control-
ling executive or legislative act, is binding upon the United
States, citizens of the United States, and other persons serv-
ing this country. 13
5
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized cus-
tomary international law as "the Law of the Land" for over two
centuries. In Paquette Havana,13 6 the Supreme Court noted that
the seizure of the Spanish fishing vessels was an official act by the
U.S. Navy during wartime, yet nevertheless, held that the action
violated principles of customary international law and ordered
the ships returned.
In the application of customary international law to the case
of No Gun Ri, the basic principles of the law of war will be the
main issues for discussion. The basic principles of the law of war
can be listed as follows:
(1) the principle of military necessity, 137
(2) the principle of humanity, 138
(3) the principle of chivalry, 139
(4) the principle of proportionality,140 and
(5) the principle of distinction.141
For example, the U.S. soldiers might argue in the present
case that it was justifiable to fire on the refugees, because they
suspected there were North Korean soldiers among them. In
other words, they may insist that it was necessary in the military
sense to act in that way in order to fight against the North
Korean Army.' 4 2 However, the principle of military necessity
135. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: UNITED STATES
ARMY FIELD MANUAL 7 (1956).
136. 175 U.S. 667 (1900).
137. See WALKER, supra note 132, at 520.
138. See id.; see also KWAKWA, supra note 8, at 34-38.
139. See WALKER, supra note 132, at 520; see also KWAKWA, supra note 8, at
34-38.
140. See WALKER, supra note 132, at 520.
141. See id.
142. In the My Lai case, on the defense that Lt. Calley believed the villag-
ers were part of "the enemy," the U.S. Supreme Court decided as follows:
[T] he uncontradicted evidence is that they were under the control of
armed soldiers and were offering no resistance .... He also admitted
he knew that the normal practice was to interrogate villagers, release
those who could satisfactorily account for themselves, and evacuate
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does notallow such a treacherous attack to be justified. In addi-
tion, the principle of humanity restricts the acts of hostility.
Actually, the United States Army Field Manual admits that the
law of war places limits on the exercise of a belligerent's power in
the interests of protecting both combatants and noncombatants
from unnecessary suffering. It says:
[The law of war] requires that belligerents refrain from
employing any kind of degree of violence which is not
actually necessary for military purposes and that they con-
duct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity
and chivalry. The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not
minimized by 'military necessity' which has been defined
as that principle which justifies those measures not forbid-
den by international law which are indispensable for secur-
ing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
possible. Military necessity has been generally rejected as a
defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conven-
tional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been devel-
oped and framed with consideration for the concept of
military necessity.'
Article 14 and Article 16 of the Lieber Instructions,14 4 an
authoritative restatement of the principle of military necessity
also states:
Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized
nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
of war .... Military necessity does not admit of cruelty-
that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering
or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in
fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. 145
Moreover, according to the principle of humanity, combat-
ants should avoid inflicting unnecessary harm and suffering.
the suspect among them for further examination. Instead of proceed-
ing in the usual way, Calley executed all, without regard to age, condi-
tion, or possibility of suspicion. On the evidence, the court-martial
could reasonably find Calley guilty of the offenses before us.
United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 25 (1973).
143. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: UNITED STATES
ARMY FIELD MANUAL (1956), reprinted in RICHARD HAMMER, THE COURT-MARTIAL
OF LT. CALLEY 14 (1971) [hereinafter HAMMER'S ARMy FIELD MANUAL].
144. SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 83, at 6.
145. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24
April 1863, reprinted in SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 84, at 3.
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Humanity consists of at least three elements: the avoidance of
unnecessary damage, the avoidance of certain means that cause
superfluous suffering,, and the principle of discrimination or
noncombatant immunity.'46 The Hague Convention (II) of 1899
and the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 are the explicit refer-
ences to the principle of humanity.1 4 7
The principles of proportionality and distinction also dis-
claim the justification of the attack on civilians. The principle of
proportionality means that the losses resulting from a military act
should not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military
advantage. The principle of distinction requires that "the armed
forces of the belligerent parties have an obligation to draw a firm
line of demarcation between civilians and civilian objects, on the
one hand, and combatants and military objectives, on the
other."14 In this regard, the No Gun Ri Massacre overfly violates
the basic principles of the law of war and customary international
law.
If a nation specifically refuses to abide by a regulation
expressed in a treaty signed by others or embodied in conduct
observed by all other nations, it is difficult to argue that such a
nation is in any way bound by that rule. However, the doctrine of
jus cogens (peremptory norms) holds that certain fundamental,
behavioral norms are absolutely binding upon all nations.
"Grave breaches" of the law of armed conflict, including willfully
killing; torturing; or inhumanely treating the wounded, prisoners
of war, and civilians are crimes against jus cogens.14 9 In this
regard, killing more than one hundred civilians, including
women and children, is evidently in violation of the law of war,
and in addition, it is a violation of a norm of jus cogens.
III. THE LAWS VIOLATED IN KoRFA AND IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 5 0
A. The Criminal Act in Korea-Murder (Article 250)
The Korean Government has the "obligation to confirm and
protect the inviolable fundamental Human Rights of the nation-
146. See KwAKWA, supra note 8, at 34-42.
147. RIcHARD SHELLY HARTiGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAw OF WAR 48
(1983).
148. KWAKWA, supra note 8, at 39.
149. See S-ANOR & TERRELL, supra note 109, at 213.
150. The author has translated the statutes analyzed in this article from
Korean to English; the citations provided are to the statutes in their original
language, Korean.
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als" under the Korean Constitution. 151 Since the No Gun Ri inci-
dent clearly violated the human rights of the Korean victims, the
Korean Government has an obligation to examine the case in
light of Korean Law. Korean Criminal Act Article 2 declares that
a foreigner's crimes committed in Korea will be governed by the
Act.152
Article 250 of Korean Criminal Act states that one who kills
another shall be punished by death, life-long, or more than five-
year imprisonment.153 Article 257 and Article 258(1) declare the
punishment for inflicting bodily harm.154 In addition, negli-
gence homicide shall be punished by the penalty of a five-year or
less detention.155 War crimes are not explicitly provided for in
the Korean Criminal Act. The distinction between murder and
manslaughter is not enumerated either.
One of the issues in the application of the regulations will be
whether the killing at No Gun Ri constitutes an intentional and
premeditated murder, or negligent homicide. According to the
evidence raised, the indiscriminate firing on the refugees by the
U.S. soldiers was an intentional and premeditated killing. They
killed the civilians knowing that they were not soldiers in the
North Korean People's Army. The killing was not accidental.
There was an order from the superiors, and they started to fire
on the refugees who were hiding under the bridge tunnel. This
means that they had intentions to kill. Thus, the incident consti-
tutes murder.
In Korea, international humanitarian law and customary
international law can also be applied as legitimate law, because
the Korean Constitution assures the legal authority of interna-
tional law. Article 6 of the Korean Constitution says, "The trea-
ties that are signed and promulgated under the Constitution,
and generally accepted international law have the same legal
authority as the internal laws have."'5 6 In this vein, crimes in vio-
lation of international law can be punished under international
law.
151. KoREAN CONST. art. 10.
152. Korean Criminal Procedure Act, art. 250(1) (1997), available at
http://www.moj.go.kr/justice/search/law/1-120.html.
153. Id., at art. 250(1).
154. Id., at art. 257. One who inflicts a bodily harm on another shall be
punished with the penalty of up to seven years imprisonment, up to ten years
suspension of the civil rights, or a monetary fine of up to one thousand won.
Id., at art. 258(1). One who inflicts bodily harm on another and causes
another's life to be in danger shall be punished by more than a year imprison-
ment, but less than ten years imprisonment. Id.
155. See id. at art. 268.
156. KoREAN CONST. art. 6.
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B. The Articles of War in the United States-Murder (Article 92)
At the time of the No Gun Ri incident, the military law that
governed the U.S. soldiers was the "Articles of War." The so-
called "common law crimes" in the military are codified in the
regulations. "The Articles of War (A.W.) was substantially revised
in 1948; it was enacted in 1920 and amended in minor particu-
lars in 1937, 1942 and 1947. ",157 On May 5, 1950, the President
signed H.R. 4080, an Act "[t] o unify, consolidate, revise, and cod-
ify the Articles of War, The Articles for the Government of the
Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard, and to enact
and establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice." 158 This
Code-the UCMJ-went into general effect on May 31, 1951.159
For the first time in American history, all members of the Armed
Forces were subject to one set of disciplinary laws. The UCMJ is
still the basic military law in United States. 6 ' However, since the
157. COLONEL FREDERIC BERNAYS WIENER, THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILI-
TARY JUSTICE: EXPLANATION, COMPARATIVE TEXT, AND COMMENTARY 25 (1950).
158. I& at 29.
159. WALKER, supra note 132, at 110.
160. See generally MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL
LAW 1-10 (1999). In the current UCMJ, homicide is:
[T] he killing of another person or human being, is punished under a
hierarchical system of punitive articles: Article 118 (murder), 119
(manslaughter), and 134 (negligent homicide). At the top of the hier-
archy is premeditated murder, which imposes the heaviest elements of
proof on the prosecution and concomitantly authorizes the most
severe punishment: death. Descending the levels of homicide, the
burden on the prosecution gradually decreases, but so too does the
amount of potential punishment.
Id. at 95. "Article 118 describes four types of murder: premeditated, unpremed-
itated, acts inherently dangerous to others, and felony murder.
[P]remeditated murders and felony murders [are punishable by mandatory life
imprisonment or death penalty]." Id. at 95. Manslaughter is classified as volun-
tary or involuntary under Article 119 (a) or (b) of the UCMJ.
Voluntary manslaughter involves a killing while 'in the heat of passion
caused by adequate provocation,' by an accused who intended to
either kill or seriously injure the victim.... Involuntary manslaughter
occurs when the accused unintentionally kills another .... while acting
in a grossly careless manner indicating an utter disregard for the fore-
seeable consequences of the actions of the accused. Under the UCMJ,
negligent homicide is similar to involuntary manslaughter, except that
this offense requires a lower degree of negligence .... The prosecu-
tion must show that the accused violated a legal duty to use due care
that caused the death, such as the duty a parent has to provide medi-
cal care for a child or the duty of an armed service member in a com-
bat zone to determine if he is shooting at an enemy or friendly soldier.
The prosecution need not show that the accused intended to kill or
harm the victim.
Id. at 97.
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No Gun Ri Massacre happened in July 1950, the provisions that
criminalize the acts at No Gun Ri should be found in the A.W.
Article 92 of the A.W. states:
Art. 92. Murder-Rape: Any person subject to military law
found guilty of murder shall suffer death or imprisonment
for life, as a court-martial may direct; but if found guilty of
murder not premeditated, he shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct. Any person subject to military law who
is found guilty of rape shall suffer death or such other pun-
ishment as a court-martial may direct: Provided, That no
person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape
committed within the geographical limits of the States of
the Union and the District of Columbia in time of
peace.161
Murder is classified in two ways in the A.W., pre-meditated
murder and murder that is not premeditated. There is also a
clause regarding manslaughter. Article 93 of A.W. states:
Any person subject to military law who commits man-
slaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, rob-
bery, larceny, perjury, forgery, sodomy, assault with intent
to commit any felony, assault with intent to do bodily harm
with a dangerous weapon, instrument, or other thing, or
assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct.
In the No Gun Ri case, Captain Chandler reportedly said,
"The hell with all those people. Let's get rid of all of them."162
This notion means that he decided to fire on them even though
he knew they were civilians. Consequently, he and the U.S.
machine-gunners were subjected to murder charges under this
clause, Article 92. Considering the fact that there were soldiers
who refused to fire on the refugees at No Gun Ri, it is hard to
believe that the killings were not intentional. The No Gun Ri
Massacre was murder under Article 92 of the A.W.
1 63
161. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE [U.S.] ARMY, MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1949 (Article 29 of the Articles of War).
162. Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
163. In the My Lai case, Lt. Calley argued that "proof of malice was as
indispensable to conviction for murder in violation of Article 118 of the UCMJ,
as it was at common law or under the predecessor Articles of War." The Court-
Martial concluded, "We find no impediment to the findings that appellant
acted with murderous mens rea, including premeditation. The aggregate of all
his contentions against the existence of murderous mens rea is no more absolv-
ing than a bare claim that he did not suspect he did any wrong act until after
the operation, and indeed is not convinced of it yet. This is no excuse in law."
Id. at 528 (United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1184 (A.C.M.R. 1973))
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In short, the Massacre at No Gun Ri is murder and a war
crime for the following reasons. First, the indiscriminate killing
of the refugees is murder under Article 250 of Criminal Act in
Korea. Second, the Massacre is in violation of Article 92 (mur-
der) of the "Articles of War" in the United States. Third, the acts
constitute grave breaches of the laws of war in the field of inter-
national law. The No Gun Ri Massacre was in violation of the
Hague Convention Preamble that explicitly protects civilians in
time of war. The incident is also against the spirit of the Geneva
Conventions. Most of all, the No Gun Ri Massacre is a grave
breach of customary international law. Hence, not only should
the soldiers at the site be charged under the laws of war, but so,
too, should the superiors who ordered or allowed soldiers to fire
on the civilian refugees and everyone in the chain of command
who assisted in the subsequent cover-up. The No Gun Ri Massa-
cre was murder and, under international humanitarian law, a
"war crime."
IV. THE LEGAL REMEDIES THAT CAN BE SOUGHT
A. Legal Remedies in Korea
1. The Possibility of Criminal Procedure in Korea
There are barriers to seeking the prosecution of the offend-
ers in Korea. First, Article 249 of the Korean Criminal Procedure
Act states that the statute of limitations for prosecution of a
crime that shall be punished by the death penalty is fifteen years.
The starting point of the period of limitation is the moment the
crime was completed.164 Accordingly, the statute of limitations
has already passed in relation to the No Gun Ri incident.
Furthermore, the Agreement Relating to Jurisdiction over Crimi-
nal Offences Committed by the United States Forces in Korea between the
Republic of Korea and the United States of America (Taejon Agree-
ment) which entered into force July 12, 1950, carries a special
provision for the criminal offenses of U.S. soldiers. It says, "The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs understands that in view of the pre-
vailing conditions of warfare, the United States forces cannot be
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 506-07 (1976) (quoting 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1184
(1973)).
"The court also stated that it has been a settled rule of American law for
one hundred years, that even in war, the summary killing of an enemy, who has
submitted to, and is under, effective physical control, is murder." Id at 528
(quoting 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973)).
164. Korean Criminal Procedure Act art. 252.
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submitted to any but United States forces."16 5 The effect of the
provision was reconfirmed by the Agreement Under Article IV of the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the and
the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea and Related Docu-
ments (SOFA);166 consequently, Korea does not have jurisdiction
over the case of the No Gun Ri Massacre under the treaties.
However, when the United States does not prosecute the
offenders even when there is clear evidence to prosecute them,
the Korean Government may take jurisdiction in light of custom-
ary international law. The No Gun Ri Massacre is not merely a
general crime, but a war crime under international humanitarian
law. Accordingly, it is possible to prosecute the offenders in
Korea regardless of the obstacles in Korean domestic law. Cus-
tomary international law makes it possible for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, torture, and genocide to be prosecuted in any
related country in case the offenders are not punished in their
own country. The Pinochet case in London was the world-famous
evidence of the presence and effectiveness of the principle of
universal jurisdiction.167 Article XXII (3) (c) of SOFA states, "If a
State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdic-
tion, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as
possible." After receiving this notice, Korea will have jurisdiction
over the case.
Under customary international law, the statute of limitations
does not apply to war crimes either. The Convention on the Non-
applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity168 is the embodiment of customary international law.
In this regard, if the United States does not prosecute the offend-
ers even after investigation, Korea may prosecute them with the
evidence of the crimes under international law regardless of the
statute of limitations.
165. Agreement Relating to the Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses com-
mitted by the United States forces in Korea, July 12, 1950, S. Korea-U.S., 5(2)
U.S.T. 1408 [hereinafter Taejon Agreement].
166. Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of
Korea and Related Documents, July 9, 1966, U.S.-Korea, art. XXII(12), 17
U.S.T. 1677, [hereinafter SOFA].
167. See Human Rights Watch, The Pinochet Precedent-How Victims Can
Pursue Human Rights Criminals Abroad, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/
chile98/precedent.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001).
168. U.N. Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR
(1968).
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It should be noted that the offenders must be present at the
Korean Court to be punished under the Korean Criminal Proce-
dure Act. Prosecutors may hold the prosecution suspended until
the offenders are arrested. Article 4(2) (b) of the Extradition
Treaty between the United States and Korea states:
Each party cannot reject the extradition in case of an
offense for which both Contracting States have the obliga-
tion to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to
their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution
pursuant to a multilateral international agreement, includ-
ing but not limited to such agreements relating to geno-
cide, terrorism, or kidnapping. 169
Consequently, the United States has the obligation to extradite
the offenders to Korea. If the offenders happen to visit Korea
after the suspended prosecution, they may be arrested by the
prosecutors.
2. The Possibility of Civil Procedure Against U.S. Offenders in
Korea
SOFA does not carry any specific provision on this issue. It
means that the victims of No Gun Ri can file the claims against
the individual perpetrators either in the United States or in
Korea. Korean Civil Act Article 750 states, "[O]ne who damages
another by voluntary or involuntary tort shall have the responsi-
bility to compensate. 17 ° Under this provision, the No Gun Ri
victims can file the claims against offenders in Korean Civil
Court.
The statute of limitations of the tort claim is three years after
the knowledge of the damages or the offenders and ten years
after the tort acts. 171 However, it does not matter, because the
statutory limitation shall not apply to war crimes. 172 Accordingly,
when the victims find defendants in Korea, they may file lawsuits.
169. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of
Korea and the Government of the United States of America, June 9, 1998, art.
4(2) (b), available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/inter-treaty-real.nsf/261660cf
456f573c 9256871002d 350b / 7D64556 CD 052FFB 949256625000 D2606? Open
Document.
170. Korean Civil Act art. 750 (1997), available at http://www.moj.go.kr/
justice/search/law/1_039.html.
171. Id. at art. 766.
172. U.N. Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 168. Article 1 states, "No
statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date
of their commission: (a) War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg [sic], of 8 August 1945 and con-
firmed by resolutions 3(1) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents claimants
against the U.S. Government from filing in Korean Civil Court.
A foreign country cannot stand in front of another country's
court.
3. Seeking Compensation Against the Korean Government
Article 29 of the Korean Constitution states, "A national may
file a legitimate claim against the State or the public body as the
law regulates, when he or she is damaged by torts of an official
on duty."17 In the same sense, the Korean State Compensation
Act Article 2(1) regulates, "If an official on duty voluntarily or
involuntarily violates the law and inflicts harm on a person, the
State or Local Government shall compensate according to this
law.""7 4 In addition, filing a lawsuit against the government
according to civil procedure is another alternative.
The victims of the No Gun Ri Massacre may raise three
arguments:
(1) The Korean Government did not help them to seek proper
remedies for their human rights violations and they some-
times discouraged the activities of the victims. The omis-
sion and. the wrongful intervention is in violation of the
Korean Constitution and international human rights law;
(2) The right.to seek remedies against U.S. forces was excluded
in the negotiation of SOFA of 1966, and consequently, vic-
tims could not seek compensation in the Korean Civil
Court. Therefore, the Korean Government is responsible
for it.
(3) In July 1950, the Korean Government transferred military
command authority to General MacArthur, whose soldiers
committed the Massacre. In spite of this transfer, the
Korean Government still had the obligation to protect the
Korean people during he Korean War, and should have
controlled the U.S. Army. In this regard, the Korean Gov-
ernment is not immune from the responsibility of the
massacre.
Those are possible arguments for the victims when they seek
redress against the Korean Government. It should also be noted
that it would be much easier to deal with the claims in a political
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly the 'grave
breaches' enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the
protection of war victims .... "
173. KoREAN CONST. art. 29.
174. Korean State Compensation Act art. 2(1) (1997), available at http://
www.moj.go.kr/justice/searCh/law/1-024.html.
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and social sense considering the nature of the incident. The
responsibility of the government will not be restricted to the
court. In this regard, the activities of the victims and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) are very important.
B. Legal Remedies in the United States
1. Criminal Procedure
The United States has the obligation to prosecute the
offenders of war crimes under international law. The primary
jurisdiction belongs to the United States under the Taejon
Agreement between the United States and Korea175 and Article
XXII(12) of SOFA. International humanitarian law also assures
the primacy of the jurisdiction of the United States. Which court
in the United States has the jurisdiction over this case? The Man-
ual for Courts-Martial, 1949 10 states:
The general rule to be followed in the Army is that court-
martial jurisdiction -over officers, cadets, soldiers, and
others in the military service of the United States ceases on
discharge or other separation from such service and that
jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of
service thus terminated is not revived by reentry into the
military service. 17
6
Hence, the No Gun Ri case shall be dealt with, not in a court-
martial, but in a civilian court. It can serve as an alternative to
establishing a new tribunal for the incident.
There is no statute of limitations in the case of murder in
the United States. Article 39 of A.W. of 1948 states:
Except for desertion or absence without leave committed
in time of war or for mutiny or murder, no person subject to
military law shall be liable to be tried or punished by a
court-martial for any crime or offense committed more
than two years before arraignment of such person. 177
The My Lai incident in Vietnam drew great attention from
the world, but it is noteworthy that Lt. Calley was not convicted
under a charge of war crimes. He was sentenced to life imprison-
175. Taejon Agreement, supra note 165.
176. MAMAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL U.S. ARMY 1949, supra note 161, at 9 1
10.
177. Id. at art. 39 (emphasis added). The statute of limitations in the
UCMJ is three years according to Article 43. There is no statute of limitations
in the case of murder. Id. at art. 43. For a comparison of the Articles of War to
the UCMJ, see id. at 25-27.
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ment on the charge of murder under the UCMJ. 178 The term,
"war crime," was technically avoided.179 This is quite odd, but
still the case. The United States Army Field Manual Article 507,
states:
The United States normally punishes war crimes as such
only if they are committed by enemy nationals or by per-
sonals serving the interests of the enemy State. Violations
of the law of war committed by persons subject to the mili-
tary law of the United States will usually constitute viola-
tions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and, if so,
will be prosecuted under the Code.180
The direct application of international humanitarian law to
the U.S. forces is avoided under this clause. Nevertheless, it is
very important to mention that the My Lai Massacre was the only
event in which the United States actually acknowledged war
crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. If it is ever prop-
erly investigated, the No Gun Ri incident will be the second big-
gest war crime case in U.S. Army history.
The charges against the offenders in the No Gun Ri case
cannot be restricted to murder under A.W. Article 92. War
crimes should be called war crimes. There is no justification for
avoidance of the application of international humanitarian law
to an overt war crime. 'justice Jackson acknowledged that if cer-
tain acts are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States
does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not pre-
pared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others
which we would be unwilling to have invoked against us."l"'
2. Civil Litigation Against the Offenders
The jurisdiction of courts-martial is entirely penal or discipli-
nary. They have no power to adjudge the payment of damages or
to collect private debts. Consequently, if the No Gun Ri victims
want to file claims against the offenders, they have to choose the
178. "[A] number of American personnel were tried under the Code for
offenes [stet] which, if they had been committed by non-Americans, would have
been described as war crimes or crimes against humanitarian law." See L. C.
Green, Symposium, International Criminal Law: Command Responsibility in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs., 319, 352 (1995).
179. According to of the Army Field Manual, "The term "war crime" is
the technical expression for a violation of the laws of war by any person or
persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime."
HAMMER'S ARw FIELn MANUAL, supra note 143, at art. 499.
180. Id. at art. 505(b).
181. Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political
Protesters, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 411 (1989) (citation omitted).
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civil procedure in the United States. Personal compensation for
the tort acts can be sought in the civil court. However, because
of the nature of the crimes, pursuing personal reparations from
the offenders is not easy and probably will not be enough. That
is why they should first take into consideration the possibility of
filing claims against the government in general.
3. Filing Tort Claims Against the United States Government
Since the Massacre was committed by U.S. officers, the gov-
ernment is not immune from state responsibility. In other
words, the No Gun Ri victims can file tort claims against the U.S.
Government. Two questions should be answered for the filing of
the claims: (a) the jurisdiction of the tort claims, and (b) the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
First, the regulations for the jurisdiction over the claims
against the United States Forces are found in SOFA. Article
XXIII(5) of SOFA states:
Claims (other than contractual claims and those to which
paragraph 6 or 7 of this Article apply) arising out of acts or
omissions of members or employees of the United States
armed forces, including those employees who are nationals
of or ordinarily resident in the Republic of Korea, done in
the performance of official duty, or out of any other act,
omission or occurrence for which the United States armed
forces are legally responsible, and causing damage in the
Republic of Korea to third Parties, other than the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Korea, shall be dealt with by the
Republic of Korea in accordance with the following
provisions .... 182
After the adoption of SOFA on February 9, 1967, Korean
Compensation Committee has jurisdiction. The United States
Code of Federal Regulations supports this rule:
(a) The governments of some foreign countries have by
treaty or agreement waived or assumed, or may hereafter
waive or assume, certain claims against the United States.
In such instances claims will not be settled under laws or
regulations of the United States. 183
However, Article XXIII(13) of SOFA provides, "The provi-
sions of this Article shall not apply to any claims which arose
before the entry into force of this Agreement. Such claims shall
be processed and settled by the authorities of the United
182. SOFA, supra note 166, at art. XXIII(5).
183. 32 C.F.R. §536.40 (2000).
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States. 18 4 Consequently, the claims of the No Gun Ri victims
against the U.S. Armed forces shall be under the jurisdiction of
the authorities of the United States.
Second, the doctrine of sovereign immunity question is
more complicated. It is based on the common law idea that the
King can do no wrong. All sovereign government entities enjoy
the privilege of immunity from any liability for the acts of their
agents and employees. However, the United States has waived
immunity for tortious acts under the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946 (FTCA), Military Claims Act (MCA), and Foreign Claims
Act (FCA). The No Gun Ri victims will have to resort to one of
those systems.
The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 provides a broad waiver
of this immunity for claims against the United States. However,
FTCA has several exceptions to liability, including "28 U.S.C.A.
§2680(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,
and (k) Any claim arising in a foreign country." The "combatant
activities" exception here means the "Governmental activities
which by their very nature should be free from the hindrance of
a possible damage suit."185 The FTCA also does not apply to any
claim arising in a foreign country. The purpose of the foreign
act exception to the FITCA "was to avoid the risk of United States
exposure to unreasonable liability under foreign law and facts
over which [it] has no control." ' 6
The Military Claims Act (MCA)' 87 supplies an alternative to
the FTCA. The MCA is designed to provide relief for any per-
sons, whether civilian or military, injured or killed as a result of
non-combatant activities of the armed forces not covered by the
FTCA. Recovery is permitted whether or not there is any indica-
tion of negligence or fault on the part of the military, or where
the claim arises in a foreign country.188 The Act authorizes the
Secretary of each service to settle claims up to $100,000.189
184. SOFA, supra note 166, at art. 23(13).
185. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948).
186. Price v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 1465, 1471 (S.D. Tex. 1989). On
Nov. 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals confirmed this assertion, but reversed this
case on different grounds. See Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46 (5th Cir. 1996).
187. 10 U.S.C.A. §2733 (1998).
188. See SHtANOR & TERRELL, supra note 109, at 326, 327.
189. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2733(d) (1998).
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The Foreign Claims Act1 9° enables the foreign country's vic-
tims to file claims against the U.S. Government. The FCA autho-
rizes the Secretaries of the various services to appoint officers to
handle claims of damage to or loss of real or personal property of
any foreign country or any inhabitant of the country. The Secre-
tary may settle and pay claims up to $100,000. The FCA also has
the precondition of "noncombatant activities." The claim must
have arisen from the act or omission of a military or civilian gov-
ernment employee not acting incident to combat activities.
If a claim is filed initially under FTCA and the claimant fails
to demonstrate negligence on the part of a government
employee, a claim under the MCA or FCA is possible. The
reverse is also true.
Each tort claims Act has a two-year statute of limitations.19 1
Nevertheless, the No Gun Ri victims can file a claim because it is
customary international law not to apply the statue of limitations
in civil procedure, as well as criminal procedure, in the case of
war crimes.
The main barrier for the No Gun Ri victims to overcome is
the question of "non-combatant activities." Many cases deny the
applicability of the Acts to the claims arising out of combatant
activities. In 1992, the United States engaged in hostile military
activities toward Iran in order to protect shipping in the Persian
Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, and a U.S. warship shot down an
unidentified civilian aircraft. In Koohi v. United States, the court
concluded that:
[C]laims for damages caused by the shooting down of a
civilian aircraft by United States warship were within Fed-
eral Tort Claim Act (FTCA) exemption for claim arising
out of combatant activities during time of war; tracking,
identification and destruction of unidentified aircraft that
appeared to pose threat to warship' safety constituted
'combatant activities' . . . .1O2
In the No Gun Ri incident, do the firings on the refugees
constitute combatant activities? Arguments against the defense
of the combatant activity exception can be made:
First, secret U.S. military intelligence reports from the time
of the incident place the North Korean frontline four miles from
190. 10 U.S.C.A. § 2734 (1998) (section entitled "Property loss; personal
injury or death: incident to noncombat activities of the armed forces; foreign
countries").
191. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2734(b) (1) (1998).
192. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680, n.75 (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d
1328 (Cal. 1992)).
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No Gun Ri on July 26th, when the refugees entered the area. It
means that the massacre did not happen in a combatant area.
Second, there is no evidence that the GIs saw gunfire from the
refugees. Some soldiers say that the Americans were answering
fire from among the refugees.19 Nevertheless, other soldiers
recall only heavy barrages of American firepower, not hostile
fire.194 The Korean victims say the Americans may have been
seeing their own comrades' fire, ricocheting through from the
tunnels' opposite ends.'
95
, it was recognizable that there were civilians, including old
men, women, and children, when the U.S. soldiers started to fire.
The information that some soldiers refused to shoot proves this
fact. In this regard, it can be inferred that the No Gun Ri inci-
dent did not occur in the context of combatant activities. The
incident stemmed from a mistaken idea and was clearly the
wrong response to the situation. Therefore, the victims of the
No Gun Ri Massacre may file claims against the U.S. Government
under the Foreign Claims Act.
CONCLUSION
In comparison with ordinary war crimes, the No Gun Ri Mas-
sacre, as a "war crime against an ally's civilians," carries special
characteristics. 196 The distinctiveness comes from the awkward
nature of the occurrence. Who could imagine that the soldiers
who came to help could commit war crimes against the allied
country's people? This abnormal aspect of the incident accounts
for all the complicated problems that arise.
First, it was hard to break the curtain of secrecy shrouding
the case. The story of the Massacre remained untold until the
Associated Press released the news on September 30, 1999 after
thorough investigations. It took almost fifty years for the victims
to bring the incident to the public. The My Lai Massacre needed
the brave disclosure of Ron Ridenhour, who sent a four-page
detailed, informational letter to "twenty-three members of Con-
gress, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Secretary of the
Army, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."' 97 Cheong
Eun Yong and the reporters of the Associated Press played a similar
193. Sang-Hun Choe et al., supra note 29.
194. "I don't remember shooting coming out," said ex-rifleman Louis
Allen of Bristol, Tennessee. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Id.
196. The My Lai Massacre (against the South Vietnamese) has already
shown how difficult it is to deal with those cases.
197. See Addicott & Hudson, supra note 47, at 159 (citation omitted).
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role for Korea. The government of the victims was reluctant to
pursue the case, because it did not want to be engaged in a diplo-
matic problem with its allies because of old happenings. For the
same reason, the government did not help the victims access the
truth and gather information.
Second, it is also hard for the victims to file claims with the
authorities. Under the military dictatorship, the No Gun Ri vic-
tims had to endure threats and insults from Korean officials. For
example, after filing the petitions in the 1960s, a survivor, Yang
Hae-Chan, was threateningly warned by the Korean police to
keep quiet about the massacre. Many of the victims were abused
by the suspicion of ideology when they properly filed their cases,
in vain. It was the dominant atmosphere under the military dic-
tatorship in Korea to assume that claims against the United States
might help the North Korean Government.198
Third, it is hard to find an appropriate remedy for the vic-
tims' emotional injuries. They were the residents of a country
that welcomed U.S. soldiers into their own land. Accordingly,
the emotional harm inflicted on the survivors is beyond descrip-
tion. They may want to see the offenders prosecuted; but after
fifty years have passed, it may be almost impossible to prosecute
the perpetrators.
Finally, and most importantly, the legal instruments that
criminalize the acts of the offenders as war crimes are not clear
enough. Partly because of the nature of the incident, and partly
because of the delayed codification of the laws of war, it is impos-
sible to find any direct international regulation that governs the
case. In addition, it is extremely hard to borrow any legal argu-
ment in the field of international law, since not many scholars
focus on such specific events.
This thesis is mainly devoted to the legal aspects of the inci-
dent. The conclusions of the research can be summarized as
follows:
(1) The No Gun Ri Massacre constitutes a war crime under
international humanitarian law. The Preamble of the Hague
Convention II and the Hague Convention IV supply the
basic rules and principles of the protection of civilians.
198. Recently, the Unified Democratic Front of North Korea released an
announcement claiming that (1) South Korean Government should apologize
for the wrong propaganda that attributed the incident to North Korean Peo-
ple's Army and (2) the victims should be compensated appropriately. Chung Il-
Yong, The Civilian Massacre Cases During the Korean War Claimed ly North Korea,
YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 1, 1999, available at http://www.tgedu.net/student/
go-kuk/nonsul/26/z02_01 1.html.
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(2) The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are not sufficient to regu-
late the acts of the U.S. soldiers at No Gun Ri, because of (a)
the date of entry into force, (b) the absence of ratification of
the United States, and (c) the obscurity of the provisions.
Nevertheless, although the codification of the protection of
the allied country's civilians in time of war was not satisfac-
tory in the Conventions, the Conventions can be used as evi-
dence supporting the fact that the No Gun Ri incident was
in violation of the laws and customs of war.
(3) Most of all, the No Gun Ri Massacre is a grave breach of
customary international law. Hence, not only the soldiers at
the site, but also the superiors who ordered or allowed to fire
on the civilian refugees, are to be charged under the laws of
war. The No Gun Ri Massacre was murder, and under inter-
national humanitarian law, a war crime.
(4) The firing by the U.S. soldiers on the refugees onJuly 26, 27,
and 28, 1950 at No Gun Ri is in violation of the Korean
Criminal Act. The acts are murder. The superiors who
ordered the crime shall be punished accordingly.
(5) The acts of the soldiers are in violation of the "Articles of
War," Article 92, which was effective at the time of the inci-
dent. According to Article 92, the firing constitutes the
crime of premeditated murder.
(6) Several legal remedies are available both in the United States
and in Korea, including criminal procedure against the
offenders, civil procedures for filing tort claims against the
offenders, and directly seeking compensation from each
Government through civil procedure, the Korean State
Compensation Act or the Foreign Claims Act.
Fifty years have passed since the No Gun Ri Massacre was
committed. This is a long time for the victims to endure the suf-
ferings of the past. However, it might be too short a time to see
the entire human rights problems solved. Although punishment
for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not very common,
we already have two great experiences: The Yugoslavia War
Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) and the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR).
Based on these experiences, the proposed International Crimi-
nal Court is waiting for the day of its entry into force. "A perma-
nent international criminal court, which would adjudicate war
crimes committed anywhere in the world, would replace the law
of force by the force of law."" 9' Thus, international humanita-
rian law has been nourished by international human rights law,
199. Susan Tiefenbrun, Editor's Message, Peace with Justice, 3 HOSTRA L.
& POL'Y SYvMP. 1, 7 (1999).
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and the gap between the two groups of laws is being narrowed.
The human rights situation in the world is improving. So is the
protection of civilians in time of war, even though it is still far
from perfect.
The concept of war crimes against ally civilians is new and
ironic. However, cases have arisen in both the Korean and Viet-
nam Wars. Korean soldiers who fought in Vietnam against North
Vietnamese forces also reportedly committed several massacres
against South Vietnamese in 1960s. Those incidents will surely
recur in the future as long as the military intervention in foreign
countries continues. Therefore, the protection of ally civilians
should be strongly emphasized, and the regulations of interna-
tional humanitarian law over war crimes should be improved to
better protect ally civilians.
As the famous historian, E.H. Carr has written, "history is the
dialogue between past and present."20 0 A critical review of the
No Gun Ri Massacre is not only an effort to correct the past trag-
edy, but also an attempt to build a bridge to the future. Solving
the decades long dark problems will pave a road to the better
relationship between the two countries. Moreover, imposing
lights on the dark yesterday will be a guarantee to a better society
tomorrow.
200. See E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY (1962).
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